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1. A small portion of system logs contains the most alarming information.
2. Filtering system logs based on document frequency, can significantly reduce the required storage 
capacity.
3. The data can be fully anonymized but still useful for some statistical analysis.
4. System log filtering significantly increases the performance of pattern detection algorithms.
5. Reducing the volume of non-informative data and combining other sources of information increase 
the accuracy of analysis results, without requiring additional computational power.
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Frequency of each event
Event1 frequency Event patterns Total events Percentage
1 - 5 358 630 0.04%
6 - 100 233 12,885 0.85%
101 - 200 52 7,493 0.49%
201 - 300 442 91,000 5.98%
301 - 400 12 3,902 0.26%
401 - 500 86 35,694 2.34%
501 - 1000 40 29,414 1.93%
1001 - 4000 55 83,848 5.51%
4002 - 10000 13 73,207 4.81%
10001 - 100000 22 803,452 52.77%
100001 – 150000 1 381,172 25.03%
ALL 1312 1,522,697
System log form Data size in Bytes
Raw system log 99,079,741
De-identified 98,006,233
De-identified + Hashed (anonymized) 50,250,651
Double hashing 4,386,137
Smart hashing 150,000 – 400,000
3.
Filtering 
the Data
Based on system logs, collected  during 10 days on 99 nodes of Taurus2 HPC system
Data is ready to be used by 
different mining approached,
including but not limited to:
• A priori-based
e.g., GSP3 and SPADE4
• Pattern-growth-based
e.g., FreeSpan and 
PrefixSpan
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Events timeline based on filtered system logs
Data filtering, significantly speeds-
up the identification process.
Filtered data requires ~95% less 
storage space.
Removing the 25% of most 
frequent events, resulted in ~50% 
speed-up!
1.
Motivation 
and 
Challenges
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 (root) CMD (/usr/lib64/sa/sa1 1 1)
 Accepted publickey for siavash from 192.43.85.67 port 742 ssh2
 pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for user Siavash
 Normal exit (1 job run)
 pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for user Siavash
 (admin) CMD (/usr/libgz/ra1 3 5)
 #001
 #002
 #003
 #004
 #003
 #001
 #001 x2
 #002 x1
 #003 x2
 #004 x1
 #003 x2
 #001 x2
 #002 > #003 > #004 > #003
 #003 > #004 > #003
 #004 > #003
Raw system log entries (list of events)
Hashed system log entries
(Event patterns)
Removal of non-informative 
entries
Detection and extraction of chains of event
Footnotes
1 Each event is a log, in which all variables are replaced by constant sample values.
2 https://doc.zih.tu-dresden.de/hpc-wiki/bin/view/Compendium/SystemTaurus
3 Generalized Sequential Pattern mining algorithm.
4 Sequential PAttern Discovery using Equivalence classes.
Anonymized (cleansed) system log entries
 (#USER#) CMD (#CMND#)
 Accepted publickey for #USER# from #IPV4# port #PORT# ssh2
 pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for user #USER#
 Normal exit (1 job run)
 pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for user #USER#
 (#USER#) CMD (#CMND#)
System logs may contain sensitive and confidential data (e.g., user credentials).
Protecting privacy is a major goal.
Increasing size of  computing systems
(in terms of components) [1]
Increasing the amount of operational logs,
produced by various components of computing systems
There are detectable patterns in the system logs.
Such patterns help system administrators detect irregular activities.
Data mining methods are well known for system log analysis [2].
Most data mining methods employ statistical approaches.
Anonymization can efficiently reducethe size (in Bytes)
of system logs.
Data in anonymized logs is still useful for further analysis [3]
(e.g., failure early-detection).
Observation
s
More than 77% of system logs are related 
to 23 different events.
10% of system logs are responsible for
more than 90% of syslog network traffic.
25% of system logs are related to a single
event and can safely be ignored.
The most alarming events are among  
the less than 1% of all system logs.
Events related to several errors, including 
“file system” failures, are located among 
the 74% of all system logs.
Results
5
43
2
1
